Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights

Early Mobilization for the December Municipal Elections

Mon, 17 Jun 2013 07:48:56 -0400

Hugo Pérez Hernáiz

The National Electoral Council has officially set municipal elections for December 8th, 2013. Between mayors and representatives to the municipal councils of 335 municipalities, up to 2,792 posts will be elected.

Both sides are already refining their mobilization strategies.

The Government

Municipal elections have a strong regional character that make them different from presidential elections. However, the December 8 elections will inevitably be seen as a sort of referendum on the Maduro government.

On June 4th, speaking to supporters in Carabobo, Maduro argued that “if recently [referring to the April 14th elections] we won in 71% of all municipalities, on December 8 we will win no less that 80% of the municipalities of the country. You can count on that.”

However, presenting unified pro-government candidates in all municipalities could be a challenge. Maduro acknowledged this during his speech in Carabobo, stating that a method was needed to “have unitary revolutionary, popular and chavista candidates in the 335 municipalities of the country. (…) Every compatriot that aspires to be mayor should humbly say: my post is at the orders of any method or unitary formula that we can find.”

Also, as a mobilization strategy he proposed a method based on turning out entire families, which sounds similar to the Comandos Familiares, the opposition’s strategy in the last presidential elections: “Let’s construct Bolivarian, socialist, humanist, and chavista households all over the country.” Starting in Carabobo, the plan is meant to extend to the rest of the country and constitute a “huge organization that has at its center the household, the family, the homes of our compatriots.” He added that the plan is to use the 1X10 (the PSUV mobilization plan for the presidential elections of December 2012), but instead of an individual plan, “I propose that now it should be 1x10 by household. The union of the Bolivarian family, the Chavista family.”

On June 6th, Maduro again insisted on the need of unitary candidates and gave further details of his family mobilization strategy: It should be built into a base structure that includes all the communities called the Network of Chavista Homes of Venezuela (Red de Hogares Chavistas de Venezuela). However he also emphasized the need to strengthen the established PSUV formal structures; in particular he mentioned that within the next three months the party should install party houses in every one of the 1,132 parishes of the country. These party houses would coordinate the work of the Battle Units of Hugo Chávez (Unidades de Batalla Hugo Chávez), the basic mobilization units of the PSUV strategy. Maduro ordered these battle units to devote the coming three months to door-to-door visits to “reengage” government supporters that might have become disenchanted.

Maduro has, in the last two weeks, traveled around the interior conversing with supporters on his show Dialogo Bolivariano, whose sessions closely resemble the format of Chavez’s Aló Presidente. In these meetings he has emphasized the need for unity in the face of the upcoming elections in order to “preserve the revolutions.” In one of the Dialogo Bolivariano in Trujillo he declared: “They won’t come back, and our actions must ensure that the fascist right never returns.”

The Opposition

The opposition faces the challenge of mobilizing its supporters despite its insistence on contesting the results of the presidential elections. This time around, as before, the opposition will face the biases of a government controlled National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE). And, this time it will likely have less media exposure for its candidates after the changes in Globovision. However, in the presidential elections on April 14th the opposition showed a stronger and more coherent mobilization strategy than in previous elections. It could build on that successful experience for December 8.

On June 5th, in a public meeting with supporters in Miranda, Capriles argued that the December 8 elections would be “very important,” and “a great opportunity to show that the country wants change.” He called for the reactivation of the Comandos Familiares for mobilization. Later that same day, Capriles declared on his new web based TV channel—which attempts to break with the government’s “hegemonic” control of television—that the elections of December 8 should be considered a “plebiscite” on the government. He insisted that in the April 14th election fraud had occurred, but that, all the same, it was necessary to vote in the next elections so as to “construct a sufficient force so that no cheating, no little tricks (triquiñuelas), could impact the results.” Capriles also declared that he had asked the MUD to name him head of the campaign for all the opposition candidates running for mayor.

Unified candidacies could also pose problems for the opposition’s many parties. The executive secretary of the MUD, Guillermo Aveledo, recently declared that the issue of unitary opposition candidates, at least for mayor, is already resolved. According to Aveledo, the candidates will be the same ones that were previously chosen in “a process that ended in the primaries of February 12, 2012, which included, following a previous agreement, a proportion of unitary agreements and consensus.” He added that “those candidacies are still in effect.” However there could still be disagreements in some regions: The Primero Justicia leader Juan Pablo Guanipa has asked the MUD to organize a primary to select the opposition candidate for mayor of Maracaibo (Eveling Trejo de Rosales of Un Nuevo Tiempo, UNT, was designated as candidate by the MUD by agreement between the parties). The National Secretary of UNT, Alfonso Marquina, has asked Primero Justicia if “it will respect the rules of the MUD or not” to select candidates.

Another conflicting issue could be the use of a single ballot card for each opposition candidate. Capriles is already insisting on the need of a Tarjeta Unica similar to the one the MUD used for the April 14^th elections.

Misinterpretation at the Center of Washington Post Criticism

Fri, 14 Jun 2013 09:05:00 -0400

[Moderators note: Thanks to Mike McCarthy for pointing out that Maduro’s margin of victory was 220,000 votes, not 120,000. The post has been corrected. -DS]

David Smilde

The Washington Post’s editorial criticizing the US for “extending a lifeline to Maduro” has a serious misinterpretation at its center.

The editorial is right when it says Maduro is confronting serious economic problems and serious political divisions in his coalition, and that the Venezuelan opposition is not recognizing Maduro’s April 14 election victory. However it is factually wrong when it says :

Other Latin American governments, while avoiding a confrontation with Caracas, have made it clear they regard the new leader’s legitimacy as questionable; the regional group Unasur called for an audit of the election results. One government, however, has chosen to toss Mr. Maduro a lifeline: the United States.”

The truth is exactly the opposite. The only government in the hemisphere that has not recognized Maduro’s election is the United States. All other countries including the US’s close ally and Venezuela’s neighbor Colombia recognized the election result quickly. Furthermore, Unasur did not call for an audit of the results, it endorsed an audit of the result after the National Electoral Council announced it. It also called on Venezuela’s political actors to recognize the electoral result.

The US’s stance makes it look like it only supports democratic elections when it likes their outcome. These optics unfortunately resonate in Latin America and further damage perceptions of the US.

None of this means there is no room for criticism of the National Electoral Council (CNE). The audit they carried out—restricted to checking the correspondence between the paper ballots and electronic tabulation—was a red herring serving only to draw attention away from the opposition’s actual complaints regarding assisted voting and witness intimidation. These complaints can be addressed by auditing the fingerprint verification record, the voting lists and the CNE’s “list of incidents.”

This could well still happen now that the audit of paper ballots is done. And rapprochement with Venezuela will put the US in a better position to encourage it.

Note however, that a complete audit will almost certainly uphold Maduro’s victory and thereby reinforce his legitimacy. The opposition has theories of how fraud could have occurred and a lot of circumstantial evidence. And they have gotten a lot of mileage from these accusations precisely because of the CNE’s decision to only do a partial audit. But there is little chance that a full audit will substantiate these claims to the point that they would overturn Maduro’s 220,000 vote margin of victory.

Thus by engaging Venezuela and encouraging a full audit, the US might ironically be tossing Maduro another “lifeline.” But they would also be reinforcing citizen trust in the electoral system and that is the greater democratic good. Diplomacy should be about mutual interests and democratic values, not partisan politics.

Q & A on Venezuela Colombia Relations

Thu, 13 Jun 2013 09:49:00 -0400

David Smilde

What are the politics of the recent tensions between Venezuela and Colombia?

The most recent tensions started when Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos agreed to meet with former presidential candidate and current Miranda Governor Henrique Capriles. For the Venezuelan government that was an affront because Capriles does not recognize Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela. Closely on the heels of that meeting Santos announced Colombia’s intention to strengthen ties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This latter is significant since NATO is the world’s most powerful military alliance.

Venezuela’s entire foreign policy has been predicated on the idea of Latin American unity and recent years have seen significant progress with the creation of the Union of Southern Nations (UNASUR) and the Council of Latin American Heads of State (CELAC). Colombia’s presence and collaboration has been an essential element of this and their moving closer to NATO could throw a wrench in regional unity.

Part of what has happened is that Juan Manuel Santos is up for reelection in May 2014 and this seems like a move to strengthen his credentials as being tough on Venezuela—both Hugo Chávez and now Nicolas Maduro are very unpopular in Colombia—and close to the United States. Santos was elected as the successor to Uribe. But one of his major policy shifts as president was to reconcile and strengthen ties with Venezuela. This has helped the Colombian economy and facilitated a peace process with guerrilla groups but included sacrifices such as pulling out of a deal with the United States to have US military presence at Colombian bases.

This of course has hurt Santos with the right wing of his coalition. More recently Santos took a lot of heat within Colombia for quickly recognizing Maduro’s electoral victory. Over the coming year we can expect him to carefully distance himself from Venezuela while seeking to not undermine relations. The FARC recently came out with a statement suggesting the Colombian elections be postponed for a year to facilitate peace negotiations. There was never any chance this would be taken seriously but it was a way for them to publicly press Santos to not play politics with the peace negotiations.

For Maduro this is a problem. He is facing economic and political problems at home and international relations represent a source of strength for him. Improved relations with Colombia were an important entry on his curriculum vitae as foreign minister and were an important sign that Venezuela could collaborate with non-leftist countries. The Maduro government orginally came out swinging wildly after the Santos-Capriles meeting but then turned around and astutely sought reconciliation with the US. This was a sort of strategic triangulation. Colombia’s meetings with Capriles and announcement that it was seeking to strengthen ties to NATO essentially represented a move towards the US. Venezuela turned around and themselves strengthened ties to the US which essentially reduces the significance of Colombia’s moves.

Is there any truth to Venezuela’s recent claims that the Venezuelan opposition has purchased 18 war planes to be located in Colombia and that they captured nine Colombian paramilitaries conspiring to kill President Maduro?

Of course stranger things have happened and from the outside it is impossible to know without actually seeing the evidence. But neither claim seems likely. Eighteen warplanes, depending on the model and whether they were used or new would cost somewhere between $250 million and $1 billion and it is hard to imagine who in the Venezuelan opposition would be willing to put forward that much money for such a venture. Any actual belligerent action would require extensive ground support, ammunition and ground troops. This does not seem plausible even if it were free.

Paramilitary conspiracies against the Venezuelan government are, of course, a possibility. But the timing seems unlikely. Assassination attempts usually come from groups who feel threatened by strong leaders that oppose their interests. But Maduro has struggled in his first two months and many people in the opposition and in Chavismo doubt he will finish his term. It’s not clear why right wing opponents of the Venezuelan government would want to take him out violently.

Venezuela has a long and porous border with Colombia which means in states close to that border there is extensive presence of guerrilla, paramilitaries and all sorts of irregular groups involved in contraband, kidnapping, and drug trafficking. Any given day of the week the Venezuelan armed forces could round up some paramilitaries or other irregulars and accuse them of whatever they want. So it would require some real concrete evidence beyond mug shots to make this story plausible.

How is this affecting the Colombian peace process?

Venezuela has been a key actor in the Colombian peace process which has most recently seen progress in talks in Havana, Cuba. As a key leftist government in the region, it has the ear of the FARC and their presence in the talks is important. Venezuelan officials have played an indispensable role in convincing FARC leaders to participate—including tasks so concrete as convincing them to leave the jungle and board the aircraft that would take them to the talks. When Santos met with Capriles, Maduro portrayed it as a betrayal for all of Venezuela’s work in favor of peace in Colombia, and recalled Venezuela’s envoy to the talks, Roy Chaderton. However, the following week he said he was not going to let this get in the way of the peace process and returned Chaderton to Havana.

What explains the frequent tensions between Venezuela and Colombia?

More than separate countries Venezuela and Colombia are like siblings who share history and culture and whose economic well-being is strongly intertwined. As such their relationship oscillates between friendship, rivalry and competition. After independence from Spain in the 19^th Century Colombia and Venezuela were actually part of the same country: La Gran Colombia. And still today there are many extended families that cross the borders with brothers, sisters and cousins of differing or dual nationalities. Culturally they share the same mixture of Andean and Caribbean culture.

Economically Colombia and Venezuela are leading trading partners for each other. Until 2011 Venezuela was part of the Andean Community of Nations and Colombia was a key market for Venezuela’s non-traditional exports. Colombia is a big provider of food imports for Venezuela. In 2009 President Hugo Chávez closed the border to commerce with Colombia which seriously hurt the Colombian economy, more than it did Venezuela. Now with scarcities in Venezuela the tables have turned somewhat and Venezuela is in a more vulnerable economic position and will want to avoid breaking off commercial relations again.

If history, culture and trade tend to unify Colombia and Venezuela, politics and security tend to drive them apart. Colombia is one of the handful of countries in the region in which there has been little evidence of the regional leftward turn. While leftists such as Hugo Chávez, Lula da Silva, Nestor Kirchner and Rafael Correa were elected and supported elsewhere on the continent, Colombians elected and supported rightist Alvaro Uribe. While South American integration was a key element of this leftward trend, Colombia solidified relations with the US with Plan Colombia including anti-drugs strategies and military cooperation. Thus Colombia has been a weak link in Venezuela’s regional plans.

As well, Colombia’s internal conflicts have spilled over into Venezuela and are in turn facilitated by poor relations with Venezuela. Colombia’s triadic violent conflict between guerrilla groups such as the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces and the National Liberation Army, the rightwing paramilitary groups, and the Colombian Armed Forces spills over into Venezuela. This of course causes problems on the Venezuelan side and complicates efforts by the Colombian government to eradicate irregular forces leading them to accuse Venezuela, not without reason, of collaboration or at least undue tolerance.

And finally, Plan Colombia has combated drug trafficking in Colombia but has essentially led to a rerouting of drug trafficking through Venezuela (and other countries) causing serious problems in Venezuela with corruption and violence.

PROVEA Releases Second International Bulletin on Human Rights

Tue, 11 Jun 2013 10:02:03 -0400

Human rights group PROVEA (Venezuela Program for Education and Action in Human Rights) has released the second edition of its new International Bulletin on Human Rights. The Bulletin is released in Spanish, Portuguese, French and English and the most important human rights issues of the month. This edition looks at the right to housing and the government’s housing mission, the conflict over indigenous land claims in Western Venezuela, and the need for dialogue in the post-electoral context.

Where Does the Venezuelan Economy Stand?

Mon, 10 Jun 2013 10:01:00 -0400

Melina Sánchez Montañés and David Smilde

Venezuela’s May economic numbers were dismal with inflation reaching a 35.2% annualized rate, growth at a 0.7% snail’s pace, and widespread scarcities of basic consumer products. How is this “stagflation” possible in an economy benefiting from oil prices over $100 per barrel?

The short answer is that Venezuela’s petrodollars can no longer meet demand. Venezuela produced an average of 3.03 million barrels of crude oil per day in 2012, providing the government with a total of USD 85.9 billion[1]. However, this was not enough to feed the dramatic growth in public spending during an electoral year, nor to supply the dollars needed for ever growing imports. This spending[2] generated an impressive 5.6%[3] annual growth rate in 2012, though at the expense of heavy local borrowing and Chinese loans. While external debt only increased by 8%[4], internal debt soared[5], rising by 65.6%.

But perhaps a more important cause of the current economic situation is the distortion of the currency system. Imposed in 2003, exchange control has rendered a progressive overvaluation of the Bolívar, which has led to a wave of imports targeted for consumption rather than investment, as well as capital flight.

When no major variation in the input of petrodollars is recorded[6] and demand remains in a steep upward slope, outside financing becomes key to ensure currency supply to the local market. This, of course, translates into higher foreign debt.

In recent months, PDVSA has resorted to additional contracts with big oil companies that will help address demand for dollars. The largest loan of USD 4 billion was secured from China, followed by USD 1.5 billion from Russia and USD 1 billion from the international Schlumberger Ltd. Even in this last case, where the negotiation amounts to an accounting change, this will free up dollars that would otherwise have gone to pay debts to Schlumberger.

Overvaluation[7] of the Bolivar also entails less public revenue from petrodollars and insufficient resources for public spending—the executive is even having trouble paying public workers’ salaries. Thus the government needs to look for dollar financing from abroad, through petro-credits or other funds such as the Fondo Chino, principally for urgent imports, but also for state expenses, augmenting Venezuela’s external debt.

Although these new credits will certainly ease the circulation of dollars in the short run, the executive has been operating with such strained foreign reserves that it seems unlikely they will be enough. External liabilities are starting to be paid off, but there is still a considerable backlog of delayed dollar requests on hold. Moreover, the government has resorted to printing money[8] in order to fulfill national liabilities and state expenses; a double-edge sword that stirs inflation while leaving demand for dollars unchanged.

The distorted currency system also provides enormous opportunities for corruption which siphons off a significant percentage of petrodollars. According to current BCV president Edmée Betancourt, from last year’s assigned currency destined to imports[9], between USD 15-20 billion represented an artificial demand. Much of these dollars leave the country as capital flight, some end up on the parallel market. But the fact that they are not used for the purposes for which they are approved means there is a growing demand for dollars on the parallel market[10].

In fact, since October 2012 the Bolívar has depreciated by approximately 51% in the parallel market. The inaccessibility of official rate dollars, the growing demand created by the overvaluation of the Bolívar and the exaggerated dependence on imports make recurring to an expensive parallel market the only feasible option.

The Maduro administration, under the economic leadership of former BCV president Nelson Merentes, is now looking for other ways of increasing dollar supply without getting into further debt by encouraging national production and industrialization and legally auctioning off more expensive dollars.[11]

Will the new pragmatic approach be sufficient? The petrodollar system is so deeply rooted in all aspects of the Venezuelan economy that reforms must be comprehensive,—correcting debt, production, shortages, speculation, and corruption, for a vicious circle of internal and external obligations is controlling the Venezuelan economy. Unless the government re-orients its economic policies or benefits from an additional windfall beyond the current $100+ price of oil, within a few years state accounts will reach an undesirable level of indebtedness.

Melina Sánchez Montañés studies Economics and Latin American Studies at Yale University.

[1] Average exports in 2012: 2.56 million barrels per day (mmbd). Average oil price in 2012: USD 103,42. The total revenue from oil exports was USD 124,459 million. However, only USD 85,982 million were effectively fiscal contribution.

[2] Public spending corresponded to 51.3% of 2012’s GDP. Although the initial national budget approved by the National Assembly amounted to VEB 297.836,7 million, the government used additional credits of VEB 140.780,5 million, with a total of VEB 438.617,2 million in 2012.

[3] Growth rate in the oil sector (2012): 1.4%. Growth rate in the non-oil sector (2012): 5.8%. Noteworthy is the fact that most of the growth computed in the non-oil areas came from non-tradable sectors, mainly finance and construction. In 2013, it is expected that non-tradable investment will fall, and consequently, affecting Venezuela’s GDP downward. The first quarter of the year only experienced a 0.7% GDP growth.

[4] From USD 98.011 million in 2011 to USD 105.779 million in 2012

[5] From USD 35.8 million in 2011 to USD 59.3 million in 2012 (before the February 2013 devaluation; USD 40.5 million after the devaluation)

[6] Petrodollar income from PDVSA: USD 124,459 million in 2012, USD 124,754 million in 2011, USD 94,929 million in 2010, USD 73,819 million in 2009, USD 125,499 million in 2008.

[7] Since currency control was implemented in 2003, there have been four devaluations up to May 2013.

[8] 8.7% of the total budget deficit of 2012 was driven by money printing

[9] Total assigned dollars for imports in 2012: USD 59 million

[10] October 2012: ~ VEF 12/USD. May 2013: ~ VEF 28/USD.

[11] At the first dollar auction after the implementation of the Sicad—which substituted Sitme—the price of the dollar was calculated to have reached the VEF 13-15/USD bound, much higher than the current VEF 6.3/USD official exchange rate.

Breakthrough in US Venezuela Relations

Thu, 06 Jun 2013 13:28:00 -0400

David Smilde

Few of us believed the rumors last week that a breakthrough in US-Venezuela relations was in the works. The obstacles seemed too large as the US still had not recognized Nicolas Maduro as the winner of the April 14 election. And Venezuelan officials at all levels had accused the US of multiple conspiracies, including one in which filmmaker Tim Tracy was supposedly financing opposition protesters. Tracy was jailed at the end of April.

But Tuesday’s news of a scheduled meeting between Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua and US Secretary of State John Kerry, and Wednesday morning’s news that Tracy had been released and expelled from Venezuela made clear that something significant could happen.

Indeed it was the highest level meeting between the two countries since Obama and Chávez shook hands at the Summit of the Americas in 2009, and represented an important breakthrough (See AP coverage here and Spanish language coverage here and here). The meeting lasted 40 minutes and ended with a photo op and brief press conference with each leader expressing the desire for improved relations, announcing a working plan to resolve differences, and the desire to reestablish diplomatic relations including the exchange of ambassadors.

The events of the past month and a half have made it hard to remember that rapprochement was in the air shortly before the April elections. The US does not have a big interest in conflict with Venezuela—a major oil supplier and consumer of US goods and services. Conflict with Venezuela does not facilitate relations with regional heavyweights like Brazil and Argentina that value their relationship with Venezuela. It also puts the US in an awkward “friend of my enemy is my friend” position with its main ally in the region, Colombia.

Venezuela has complex interests with respect to the US. On the one hand, denunciations of the US as an imperialist power trying to undermine the Bolivarian government was a key rhetorical tool for Chávez and Maduro appeals to it frequently—something the US generally makes quite easy. However, Venezuela also has an interest in good relations with US as its number one commercial partner in tough economic times.

Furthermore, with a tough political scene at home, international relations are Maduro’s primary source of strength. While polls within Venezuela show a steady decline in Maduro’s popularity versus a steady increase for rival Henrique Capriles, he has been recognized and warmly embraced by all countries in the hemisphere except for the US. Indeed not only did Jaua meet with Kerry yesterday, Maduro softened his approach to tensions with Colombia.

International Terrain Gets More Complicated for Venezuela

Tue, 04 Jun 2013 23:43:06 -0400

David Smilde and Hugo Pérez Hernáiz

Last week’s meeting between Miranda governor Henrique Capriles and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos began a sequence of events that has revealed the fragility in what has been heretofore a source of strength for the Maduro government—international relations.

The private Santos-Capriles meeting at Casa de Nariño in Bogotá lasted less than an hour and was low key. There were no public declarations or joint statements after the meeting, and only one photo was released showing a formally attired Capriles shaking hands with a casually dressed Santos.

However the reaction by the Venezuelan Government was strident. Almost every high official of the government used strong language to refer to the meeting. Elias Jaua, Venezuelan Foreign Minister, declared that “To receive a person that does not recognize the Venezuelan institutions and that openly called for violence on April 15^th is a very bad sign and reveals what we have repeated many times: there is a conspiracy against Venezuela from Bogotá.

In response to the meeting President Nicolas Maduro recalled Roy Chaderton, Venezuelan envoy to the Colombian peace negotiations in Cuba. “I have doubts whether this peace process should continue…During the electoral campaign I received envoys from President Santos and, authorized by him, I negotiated with the Colombian guerrilla in order to achieve peace in Colombia…Now he repays us with this? With betrayal?”

Colombia has attempted to reassure the Venezuelan Government. Its Foreign Minister Maria Ángela Hoguín declared that her Government would treat the issue directly with Venezuela and avoid the harmful “microphone diplomacy” of the past. The Colombian Vice-President Angelino Garzón declared: “We recognize the legitimately elected government of Venezuela headed by the President Nicolas Maduro.” But added that President Santos “has autonomy to receive any person he may consider appropriate.”

While reactions from the Maduro government were as over-the-top as one might expect from what we saw in April and May, it should not surprise that its reaction to Santos meeting with the leading figure of the opposition who does not recognize the government’s legitimacy would be quite negative.

Indeed at first it was a little hard to understand why Santos would agree to the meeting. One of the most important, perhaps defining policy shifts of Santos’ presidency has been the warming of relations with Venezuela. This turnabout helped the Colombian economy and put Colombia on more solid footing in new regional multilateral initiatives like the Union of Southern Nations (UNASUR) and the Council of Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State (CELAC). It is also a policy that has sunk political costs for Santos (for example the animosity of his mentor, former President Alvaro Uribe) which would normally work against change.

But within days it became clear that this might be just one element of a larger shift in Colombia’s international positioning that creates greater complexity for Maduro. On Saturday June 1st, Santos revealed that Colombia would be seeking a collaborative relationship with the most powerful military alliance in the world, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Maduro, on a State visit to Nicaragua, reacted quickly to the announcement: “There are people that now want to bring invading armies of the world to Latin America, this contradicts international doctrine and the legal framework on which union is based.”

On Monday Maduro said “don’t think that what happened in the past couple of days was simply a misunderstanding as President Juan Manuel Santos has called it…what is happening now with the announcement that they are going to NATO is a negative turn towards an agenda of regional destabilization and division, an attack against the Bolivarian revolution and adhesion to hegemonic imperial attacks.”

Here again, overstatements aside, there is reason for Maduro to be concerned. Venezuela’s international position is a strength for his government—indeed one of his responses to the domestic troubles of his first month in office was to take an international trip to receive the warm support of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. The relationship with Colombia was an important sign that Venezuela was a reasonable country that could collaborate and have a healthy relationship with a non-left government. Furthermore, Venezuela was a key player in the creation of UNASUR and CELAC and their strength is vital for Venezuela’s international support. UNASUR was present at the Venezuelan elections and quickly showed support for Maduro. Colombia’s movement towards NATO will likely sap strength from regional integration and could even become a wedge issue in these new multilateral bodies.

There were other signs of a weaking international position for Maduro. On Monday, June 4, Venezuelan representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) Roy Chaderton was booed and interrupted when he addressed a meeting of civil society representatives. Chaderton berated the Venezuelan members of the Youth Network of the Americas who had atended and were requesting the implementation of the OAS Democratic Charter against the Venezuelan government. The youth delegation stood up and walked out as Chaderton called them “fascists.”

Turmoil at Globovisión

Thu, 30 May 2013 09:01:20 -0400

Hugo Pérez Hernáiz and David Smilde

What originally appeared as a visible but subtle change of direction at television station Glovovisión has in the last two weeks become a raucous turning point with multiple journalists being fired or resigning. The turmoil leaves Globovisión’s role as an opposition outlet in doubt and appears to represent a new extension of the Venezuelan government’s control over broadcast media.

Following Guillermo Zuloaga’s announcement in March that he had agreed in principle to the sale of Globovisión it was finally acquired at the beginning of May by a business group rumored to have ties with the Government.

Announcement of the hiring of journalists Vladimir Villegas and Leopoldo Castillo as station directors generated considerable optimism about the new Globovisión and its independence. However on May 13, after a meeting with the new owners, Villegas surprisingly announced on Twitter that he would not be accepting the position after all. He commented that “we didn’t reach agreement on programming nor on what my competencies would be.”

One of the new owners, Juan Domingo Cordero, declared on May 16th that there had been disagreements in the meeting with Villegas over the general direction the business should follow, but he assured that there would be no changes in the channel and that all the journalists would keep their jobs: “All the news anchors are staying, there won´t be any changes here.”

However events have unfolded quite differently.

On May 22, President Nicolas Maduro met with two of the new owners of the Channel, Raúl Corrín and Gustavo Perdomo in Miraflores. The meeting was qualified by the business men as “cordial” and they declared that they had told Maduro that Globovisión would contribute to “the decrease in the levels of violence in the country.” Information Minister Jorge Arreaza, also present in the meeting, revealed that Maduro had insisted on the need for “generating television content with transcendent values for the future of the children and the need to struggle against fascism, which is a threat to society in any part of the world.”

Only two days after that meeting with the government, Globovisión confirmed rumors that Ismael García (opposition National Assembly representative and responsible for making public the Mario Silva audio) would leave his morning opinion program “Aló Venezuela.” The program will still be aired with co-host Delvalle Canelón but without García. The statement explained that the policy of the channel was not to air programs hosted by candidates for political office, and since García would be a candidate for Mayor of Caracas in the upcoming municipal elections, the channel had asked him to leave the program. In Venezuela it is common for elected leaders and candidates for office to simultaneously work as broadcast journalists.

The next day the channel also announced that the popular late night host of the show “Good Night,” Francisco Bautista “Kiko,” would leave Globovisión. On the same night of the 26th Henrique Capriles tweeted several times about Globovisión. He expressed solidarity with the workers of the channel and claimed that the new owners had given express orders not to provide live coverage of his speeches and declarations.

On Monday 27th, news anchor Pedro Luis Flores, and “Buenas Noches” cohost Carla Angola announced they had quit Globovisión in solidarity with Kiko. The Globovisión web page announced the reporters where leaving the channel in “the best of terms,” That same day Globovisión published a statement on its web page reaffirming that the exit of García had been on friendly terms and that “Kiko” had made misinformed declarations on the matter. The statement denies the existence of a “list of professionals” that will be fired, and ends with the assertion that “media outlets are not political parties”.

That same afternoon, reporter Leopoldo Castillo (popular host of the show “Aló Ciudadano” and now temporary Director of Globovisión), in a statement aired by Globovisión declared that there had been misunderstandings recently and that he would do everything in his power to keep the channel’s personnel “united,” but if that was not possible, he would simply leave. He also asked his fellow reporters to “not respond emotionally” and impulsively. He added that if he discovered recent events in the channel where part of a “systematic policy, which up to date I have not uncovered, you can be sure that I will speak out.” (The video can be seen here.)

That same night Kiko declared to CNN en Español that his meeting with the new owners of the channel had been “very aggressive”, and that they had “used the same arguments that the oficialismo [government] uses to attack me. They told me that the channel had been used as a political party and was responsible for what had happened in the country. They told me that I used slander and that I made fun of people.” He also denounced that the day Ismael García had made public the Mario Silva audio, in several occasions they had tried to take it off the air “and then that night at news hour, when that information was given, the reporter that wrote the note said that it had been edited. They took out the parts where Diosdado Cabello was named.”

In a press conference, Kiko reiterated that the new board of directors is exercising censorship in line with the Government. He also declared that during his last meeting with the new directors, they had offered to buy the name of the show “Buenas Noches,” which Kiko owns, but that he had refused.

On Tuesday 28 Maduro declared that the problem with Globovisión is not disagreements over a supposed change of editorial line but a fight between different factions of the “right” for control of the channel: “They are dealing with a huge problem among themselves…In the end they are the ones that are destroying the TV channel that the fascist right used to poison the country: Globovisión.”

The Globovisión official twitter account has suffered an “unfollow” campaign by opposition followers unhappy with what they perceive is a change in the editorial line of the channel. According to Noticias 24, the account had 2,732,394 followers on Sunday 26th. At the time of writing this post the account has 2,349,779 followers.

Conspiracy Theories Continue to be Central to Maduro Government

Tue, 28 May 2013 10:01:00 -0400

Hugo Pérez Hernáiz and David Smilde

In the six weeks since Venezuela’s snap presidential elections conspiracy theories have continued to be central to the Maduro government’s public statements. Illiberal movements are premised on the idea that transparent and accountable institutions are a sham, a smokescreen for the real action that takes place behind the scenes. As such they are constantly tuned in to signs of a conspiracy, a coordinated action that takes place covertly to achieve an end in a way that would not be considered legitimate were it made public.

In the Venezuelan case, conspiracy theories are to be understood in the context of anti-imperialist and anti-American rhetoric that, given the long history of US intervention in the region, resonates well with part of the population.

As we argued previously, whether they are true or not, denunciations of conspiracy have the same effect. They unify followers behind leadership that has information about a treacherous but silent enemy. They silence dissent by making it look out of place given the urgency of the situation. And, of course, they serve as an efficient way to deflect criticism over problems of governance.

Since our previous post we have continued to track the conspiracy theories forwarded by the Maduro government.

April 17, Maduro argues that problems of high inflation and shortages of goods are due to an “economic war” waged against the country. See also declarations a month later. On May 11 the Minister of Agriculture, Iván Gil, declared that the government is facing “a problem of sabotage in the process of food products distribution with the purpose of destabilizing the Bolivarian government.”

April 19, Maduro claims that his government has defeated the latest “phase of a coup d’état.” He argues that “there is no opposition in Venezuela, but only a permanent conspiracy supported by the United States.”

April 26, In a news conference Interior and Justices Minister Miguel Rodríguez Torres reveals that the government has detained a US citizen named Timoty Hallet Tracy that, according to the Minister, belongs to a US “intelligence organization” and that had been handing out money to “students and parties of the right with the aim of generating violence.” Tracy is still detained pending trial.

April 25, Two days before his arrest, state television (VTV) aired news claiming that Antonio Rivero was a CIA agent that had been recruited by the US State Department three years ago, with the aim of “denouncing the supposed ´cubanization´ of the FANB”. VTV shows a video of Rivero participating in the post April 14 election protests and giving instructions to protestors. Rivero has since then been granted a conditional release pending his trial:

May 4, Maduro claims that “sectors of the right” are in cahoots with former president of Colombia Alvaro Uribe and paramilitary mercenaries that are “trying to penetrate the country through jungle trails.” Maduro had also accuses Uribe of being behind the murder of Johnny González, a sports journalist shot in Caracas.

May 4, Maduro calls US President Obama “chief of the devils,” and alerts “all independent governments of a plan by the North American government to produce what has been called ´The War of the Dogs´ in Venezuela, to justify an imperialist intervention.”

May 4, On national television, Maduro accuses opposition Mayor of Caracas Antonio Ledezma of being a “traitor to the fatherland” for meeting Mayors of the Miami area, and calls the on the General Attorney (Fiscal General) to open an investigation on him: “We cannot accept someone asking for the interventions of a country like the US in internal matters.” On May 8, Socialist party representatives denounce that on his trip to Miami Ledezma had met with “agents of the spying web of the Israeli Mossad.”

May 6, The new Justice and Interior Minister, Miguel Rodríguez Torres gives details of a “conspiracy plan” that aims at “intoxicating society with fear and destabilization” by making demands for the non-recognition of established institutions. The conspirators include NGOs, political parties, the media, and social media web sites.

May 14, Maduro announces there is a plot to make him quarrel with National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello, and then “physically eliminate” one of the two, so as to blame the survivor for the crime.

May 16, During a visit to the State of Barinas Maduro blames the citizen security problem on the “fascist right”. He declares that he has “no doubt that the right, and external factors, are bringing in groups in order to kidnap and kill for money…they did the same thing by bringing in hard drugs to our barrios, to give away for free to young people.”

May 20, After the opposition reveals a recording of Mario Silva reporting to a Cuban agent, Silva writes on twitter that it was a montage created by the Israeli Mossad.

May 27, Maduro says the international press is coordinated and promoting “psychological warfare” to justify an intervention in Venezuela.

Reactions to Silva Tape Reveal Dilemmas of Chavismo

Sat, 25 May 2013 11:26:00 -0400

David Smilde

If Monday’s release of a recording of pro-government talk show host Mario Silva detailing corruption and conspiracies in the government simply made public what was long an open secret, the response in the following days has provided a window into the balance of power within and dilemmas confronting Chavismo.

What at the moment looked like it could be a power play from the left of the coalition, in which Maduro, Silva and their Cuban advisors might be moving to marginalize National Assembly president Diosdado Cabello, quickly turned into a scramble for cover. Immediately after the release, Silva tweeted that a Zionist conspiracy was in the works. Later he read a statement on his program saying the recording was a montage created by international foes of the revolution but that he was going to take a break from his television show to seek medical treatment in Cuba. The next day Silva posted a reflection which included more denials and a folksy story about his long, warm relationship with Cabello.

Maduro restricted his responses to ad hominem attacks on those who released the video, suggesting it was an attempt to divide the revolution. The next day almost everyone alluded to in the recording went to Orchila Island with the manifest purpose of watching military maneuvers but clearly with the goal of addressing the fallout from the recording.

In all of this the main object of accusations in the recording, Diosdado Cabello, remained eerily cool and unphased. Cabello refused discussion of the recording in the AN and calmly suggested hat he had weathered many storms over the years.

Perhaps most revealing was how slow the Chavista bases were to publicly challenge the rather fantastic theory of a montage or criticize Cabello. One might have thought that at least some among the Chavista base would have seen this as a long awaited opportunity to denounce the “endogenous right” as responsible for the corruption within the government. Instead, the following day, most mentions of the tape denounced it as a fabrication, provided words of solidarity for Silva, and didn’t even mention Cabello. This gave the impression of Cabello as a sort of untouchable that few Chavistas will even risk mentioning.

Only three full days later did some critical voices emerge from within Chavismo. Commentator and activist Nicmer Evans wrote that it was key to the morale of the movement to investigate whether the recording was authentic or not and the accusations made in it. Roland Denis suggested that the idea of a montage was “perfectly stupid” and wondered about the lack of criticism. “Evidently we have here a fear of losing everything, which silences voices to the point of swallowing the truth and the revolutionary impulse to breakdown lies and oppression.”

But there is likely another reason that criticism from within Chavismo has been slow in coming. At the beginning of the recording Silva repeatedly talks about Cabello’s “fuentes de financiamiento” which should be translate as “sources of funding.” Indeed, high level corruption networks of the type Silva is describing are not primarily designed for personal enrichment (although they undoubtedly serve that purpose as well). Rather they function as a sort of parallel government that can do things with a speed and dexterity that the state cannot, and maintain power through clientelism and patronage. Indeed it has been an open secret for years that Cabello’s network funds everything from public works, to the Socialist Party (PSUV), to grassroots collectives.

Thus the battles within Chavismo are not properly thought of as the organized Chavista base versus corrupt government elites. Rather, many people at every level of the government and the movement either benefit from Cabello’s network or understand its power and are afraid to challenge it. In the recording Silva says “Nicolas is trapped.” The same could be said of the rest of Chavismo.

For the time being it seems like the Silva tape has only reinforced Cabello’s position and power. However, there is discontent in Chavismo among those who realize that their support is rapidly descending to their bedrock of 30-35 percent. Indeed it is hard to imagine Chavismo as currently configured garnering 55-60% support as it did under Chavez. They know that Cabello is an electoral liability and this discontent could lead to movement, but probably not in the short term.

And perhaps not in the medium or long term. Textbook sociology of organizations would suggest that political movements have no built in equilibrium function that makes them choose the most adaptive and functional strategies. In 1998 Venezuela’s social democratic party Acción Democratica chose Luis Alfaro Ucero as their presidential candidate not because he was popular but because he had an iron grip on the party. It was a collectively irrational choice made by rational individuals protecting their own interests that put an end to AD’s viability as a broad-based party and movement. The same could happen to Chavismo.

Recording of Mario Silva Reveals Divisions and Corruption in Government

Mon, 20 May 2013 16:07:00 -0400

David Smilde

The opposition’s big news, publicized for 24 hours, actually exceeded expectations. They played an audio recording (see transcript here) of television host Mario Silva speaking with Cuban G2 agent Aramis Palacio. The interview is crystal clear, vintage Silva vocabulary and style, and incredibly damning of Diosdado Cabello. In the recording Silva portrays Maduro as weak but honest and well-intentioned.

As one analyst put it, what was once an open secret, is now public knowledge. Nothing in the audio will surprise those close to the inner workings of the government. But it will have an impact among everyday chavistas as well as those independents that support the government.

Of course the question is how this audio, apparently taped by Silva himself in order to send to Raul Castro, got in the hands of the opposition.

At first glance this looks like a maneuver on the part of Maduro and Silva to bring to light Cabello’s treachery and definitively marginalize him. Supporting this interpretation is that Maduro did not order a cadena to block transmission until after the audio was completely run on the air. One could imagine Maduro using this to publicly confront Cabello.

However, making this seem a little less like an intentional maneuver on the part of Silva and Maduro are the reactions. Government media have been entirely silent about the whole thing while it ran and until now. Silva did not tweet during the whole video and only afterward said it was a Zionist fabrication and that he would make an official declaration soon. Since then he has been retweeting all sorts of messages of support. One would think that if this had been a planned maneuver, he would have remained silent for awhile or searched for something other than a way to deflect it.

Maduro has not given any signals about his reactions to the audio either. Instead after the audio ended a cadena started with him talking calmly about the Plan Patria Segura. As one analyst pointed out, he looked like George W Bush reading a story to school children immediately after 9/11 had happened.

The coming days will tell what this means within the government. This definitely weakens the government overall in terms of public support since it confirms everyone’s worst suspicions. And it is hard to imagine the government continuing on with Cabello at the helm of the AN as if nothing has happened. However, Maduro’s actual power over Cabello is not great. Institutionally, Cabello is an elected deputy and has parliamentary immunity.

The Impact of Plan Patria Segura on Police Reform in Venezuela

Sun, 19 May 2013 09:59:13 -0400

Rebecca Hanson

The recent announcement of the Plan Patria Segura by the Maduro government (see reports here and here), which puts the armed forces in the street alongside the National Police force, signals a continued reliance on the military to combat crime in the country (see previous post here).

On the one hand, many Venezuelans see the military, especially the National Guard, as more capable of dealing with “el hampa” (criminal activity) than the police. Furthermore, including the army in citizen security initiatives might signal to some that the government recognizes the gravity of the crime situation and is responding in full force.

On the other hand, continuing to rely upon militarized initiatives to control crime seems to contradict the steps forward that police reform has made in recent years. The National Bolivarian Police force (the Policía Nacional Bolivariana, or PNB), created by a 2008 organic law, was the result of efforts by human rights activists, scholars, and those within already existing police bodies to create a preventative, professional, and non-militarized citizen security force.

Much of the PNB’s training is dedicated to courses on human rights and the differential use of force. Interestingly, some PNB officers have told me that the military are not adequately equipped to protect citizens because they do not have the training in these areas that PNB officers do. However, largely because of this training and the new discourse around policing, the PNB is also characterized by many citizens and officers as relying on too “soft” of an approach to be able to deal with “delinquents.”

The military in Venezuela, as in other Latin American countries, is associated with a repressive and mano dura approach to citizen security—precisely the kind of security culture that police reformers have tried to move away from. Since at least 2008 reformers have tried replace this security model with one oriented around prevention, dialogue, and the progressive use of force. However, the implementation of this new model has been accompanied by a continued uptake in crime and homicides and an increase in officers’ deaths.

An increase in violence—which has overwhelmingly affected lower class Venezuelans and police officers themselves—has resulted in an opinion among officers that the new model is “beautiful” in theory but puts both citizens and officers in danger. According to some officers, this model cannot produce results in Venezuela’s urban context, where young kids are armed to the teeth, operate according to their own laws, and “laugh at the humanist approach” to which PNB officers are taught to adhere. Officers are quick to report that they or fellow cops have been spit on, yelled at, or even physically assaulted by citizens who they say have “lost respect” for the police since the reform’s implementation.

The Plan Patria Segura’s deployment of the military in popular sectors of the city would only seem to support this opinion. Given the continued spike in homicide rates, the deployment of the military in high crime areas corroborates the belief that a non-repressive approach to security cannot deal with the reality in “los callejones” (the labyrinth of alleys and stairways in the barrios that make police work particularly dangerous).

However, the same officers who believe that “a bit of repression is necessary” to deal with crime also report that the main problem they currently face in their work is Venezuela’s high rates of impunity. As multiple officers have told me, they frequently see “malandros” (criminals) back out on the street only a few days after they have apprehended them. Deploying the military into the barrios to make mass arrests or deter crime for a few weeks with an increased security presence does nothing to address the impunity that some officers see as the main reason that citizens have already lost faith in the new police.

Of course, officers’ criticisms of the judicial system can be seen as part of a tough-on-crime approach to due process, which demands quick sentencing and minimal respect for defendants’ rights. However, it is also important to note that officers recognize the problem of crime as a holistic one that has to be addressed within various state institutions—not just by putting more officers in the streets or applying mano dura policing.

Another reason that military deployment is worrisome is that the National Guard and other branches of the military are not subject to the internal and external supervisory bodies that have been created and organized by the policing university, the General Police Council, and the new policing laws. This means that there are virtually no mechanisms by which citizens can control the military’s treatment of citizens or denounce their abuse of civilians. While these oversight bodies are new and far from perfect, they represent an important step towards the oversight of security forces in the country—at least for the police. Indeed, officers I talk to have mentioned their preoccupation with being reported to these bodies and seem to believe that their operation has kept corruption in the PNB relatively low (i.e. in comparison to other police forces).

The lack of citizen oversight of military policing came up at a meeting I attended last year where a representative of the General Police Council was presenting information about citizen-run police oversight committees in Caricuao. This southwestern sector of Caracas is currently policed by both the PoliCaracas (the Libertador Municipality’s police force) and the National Guard. While there was a lot of interest on the part of citizens to create a committee for the PoliCaracas, people also wanted to know how these committees could supervise the National Guard. Multiple stories were exchanged in the meeting about the National Guard’s abusive and corrupt practices in the sector. The only answer the representative could give was that the police council and the committees were only legally empowered to oversee the police. As a result, National Guard officials have fewer incentives to avoid engaging in abusive practices.

This becomes complicated when military officers pass detainees onto the police. Police officers have to worry about being held accountable for abuse that takes place at the hands of a military officer when they pass a detainee onto the police. As one officer retorted after a fellow officer mentioned the plan, “What happens is that the armed forces will grab someone, break their ribs, and pass them onto me for the procedimiento” (the paperwork and case proceedings that take place when someone is arrested or detained). He went on to explain that as soon as someone notices that the detainee’s ribs are broken “it will be ‘Rodriguez violated his human rights’ and I will be blamed.”

Maduro’s new security plan is not unique when compared with those of Chávez and other leaders in the region. With the continued rise in crime and homicide, leaders often turn to the military when solutions that require long-term implementation fail to produce rapid results. In order to show that they are tough on crime and take the issue of citizen security seriously the army is rolled out, which winds up undercutting progressive reforms that leaders previously supported. And, once on the streets, it can be hard to pull back the armed forces and their negative impact on reform.

Maduro’s Rocky Start and the Future of Chavismo without Chávez

Sat, 18 May 2013 11:30:00 -0400

David Smilde

I did an interview with Al Jazeera’s “Min Washington” program yesterday regarding the challenges and future of Chavismo without Chávez. I would put it up on the blog but it won’t air until next week and then will have Arabic voice overs. Here is a summary of what I said.

The first issue we talked about was Maduro’s rough first month and what it means for Chavismo after Chávez. I suggested that indeed it has not been easy. The election was closer than anybody thought it was going to be, with approximately 6% of the electorate switching from Chávez to Capriles between October 2012 and April 2013. Since then Maduro’s numbers have only worsened with majorities of the Venezuelan population disagreeing with the National Electoral Council’s (CNE) decision to not do a full audit, and some polls suggesting that Henrique Capriles would win if new elections were held. The optics of the April 30 violence in the National Assembly (AN) were terrible, and the government’s video trying to blame it on the opposition only turned tragedy into farce.

What is incredible is that Maduro’s rocky first month has come without really beginning to address the significant political and economic challenges Venezuela faces. There has been no talk of the communal state-something that is important for the left part of the coalition. And only in the past week have Venezuela’s economic issues come to the fore.

The Maduro government is sitting on a lot of oil and has a lot of income so it is not as if it is going off the fiscal cliff. However, it does have a serious foreign exchange problem. The currency is dramatically overvalued, increasing dependency on imports. At the same time, the government’s operative foreign currency reserves are critically low, meaning they cannot approve all of the dollar requests they receive. Thus, they are forced to choose between three undesirable options: deplete reserves, devalue the currency, or permit shortages of basic goods. Maduro devalued the currency in February, and it almost cost him the election. Now it seems like he has chosen to permit shortages.

This rocky start does raise questions regarding just how sustainable “Chavismo without Chávez” really is as a project that can sustain a broad consensus. Indeed, it now seems weaker than many of us thought it was before Chávez’s passing. I attribute this to two basic reasons.

First, in his second term, with the move to a discourse of socialism, Chávez adopted a model of politics and governance that deemphasized accountability and transparency as well as institutional solidity of any kind. The missions, participatory organizations, the proliferation of ministries, and the PSUV itself were all developed with big pushes that emphasized revolutionary commitment and constant change. Chávez was able to keep this hypertrophic project together through charisma and resources, but it is not clear that anyone else will be able to. Within the movement and the government, people complain that there is neither a sense of who is in charge nor in what direction they are headed.

The second reason is that in recent years the Chávez project developed a discourse predicated upon the idea that they were a clear and ever growing majority. At this point, it is very difficult for anybody within the government to do or say things that suggest otherwise, and this explains some of the Maduro government’s miscalculations.

In the hours and days after his squeaker of an election win, Maduro’s statements towards the opposition and the citizens that voted for it were not based on recognition and reconciliation but were belligerent and dismissive. An unknowing observer would have thought he had won by 15 percentage points not 1.5.

The CNE’s decision not to do a complete audit (i.e. one that doesn’t just verify the correspondence of paper ballots and electronic vote count but which includes the voter lists and the CNE’s lists of incidents and fingerprint mismatches) would make sense if there had been a clear margin. But after a close election, following a campaign in which the abuse of public resources and institutions in favor of Maduro was evident to all, it has seriously weakened him and will permanently allow national and international opponents to question his legitimacy as president.

And denying the opposition the right to speak in the AN unless they recognized Maduro’s legitimacy only reinforced an image of a government that does not respect pluralism, freedom of speech, and legal principles.

Despite all of these problems, it is important to remember that Maduro is not actually weak and vulnerable. His government controls all institutions and has a lot of income at its disposal. He actually has the margin to flail around for a while and still be safe. The opposition’s next opportunity to try to replace him is not for another three years when they can organize for a recall referendum.

I don’t think this means we are in the presence of the “slow death of Chavismo,” as one famous novelist has repeatedly suggested. The figure of Hugo Chávez and what he stood for will not be forgotten soon, and I expect it to be an important basis of political mobilization in Venezuela and elsewhere for decades to come. However, at this point, it is hard to imagine Chavismo as currently configured recovering the 60% majorities it has had in the past. Of course, we are only one month into the Maduro administration and a lot can change over the coming years.

The opposition has been running political circles around Chavismo in the past month, setting the agenda and gaining ground with every government misstep. They have been able to take accusations of irregularities and hypothetical scenarios in which voter intimidation, double voting, and assisted voting could account for the 1.5% margin, and make them stick, because the CNE has not used the information it has at its disposal to debunk them. Listening to public discourse and people on the street, one gets the sense that the opposition has the advantage.

But the opposition has its own history of overplaying its hand, and the speed with which its lead figures have begun to declare that they are the new majority in Venezuela is worrying. Everyone understands political rhetoric, but it is not unlikely that some of the key figures actually believe what they are saying and will act accordingly. They seem to think that continuing to maneuver on the issue of election irregularities nationally and internationally is going to somehow bring them to power. Indeed, it has worked for them so far, and it is hard to argue with success. But at a certain point they will have to move on and give people a reason to support them.

The last issue the interviewer asked about was whether these difficulties could undermine the changes in the region’s international relations that Chávez is credited for. I suggested it would not for several reasons, the most important being the declining influence of both the US and Venezuela in the region.

Chávez was an important catalyst in the region’s turn towards greater independence from the US and integration among Southern nations. However, in recent years other countries have become important actors in this regard. Furthermore, other left experiences have shown themselves to be more sustainable than Venezuela’s. Put differently, in recent years Brazil has emerged as a much more viable leftist governing project and a more important leader of regional integration and autonomy than Venezuela.

And while Chávez was an important catalyst and Venezuela an important leader at a certain stage, other factors were just as important. The US focus on the Middle East, its loss of international prestige as a result of the war in Iraq, and its economic difficulties have made it less important in the region, while China has increased. Thus, Chávez’s regional legacy is not dependent on the success of Chavismo without Chávez.

Provea’s 2012 Report: Civil and Political Rights

Fri, 17 May 2013 19:48:20 -0400

Timothy Gill

Last week Provea released its 2012 annual report on human rights in Venezuela. In a previous post, I outlined their findings regarding economic, social, and cultural rights, as they are presented in the 1999 Constitution. In this post, I review the report’s key findings concerning civil and political rights.

Perhaps the most important finding was continuing deterioration in citizen security. In 2012, official figures say there were 14,852 homicides, a number which continues at an upward trend. For Venezuela, this means a rate of 51 homicides per 100,000 citizens. This number rises to 23,506 homicides, or 78 per 100,000 citizens, when deaths occurring while “resisting arrest” and deaths under investigation are included (42). By comparison, in 2010, there were 13,080 homicides, 45 per 100,000 citizens. With the inclusion of those “resisting arrest” and deaths under investigation in 2010, the number of homicides rises to 21,080, a rate of 73 homicides per 100,000 citizens (407). Provea does not provide homicide figures for 2011 in this report. Until August 2012, 155 police and military persons were also killed while on duty. The report argues that the government has begun to address these issues through the Great Mission to All Life in Venezuela as well as establishing the Presidential Commission for Disarmament, which established a national gun registry to in order to reduce illegal gun ownership.

In 2012, there were 103 complaints that an individual’s right to personal integrity had been violated by Venezuelan police and military forces. These complaints most commonly included aggressive physical violence (52%), but also included injuries from firearms (12%), the use of electric shock (11%), and suffocation (9%) (37). Provea shows that there has been a 35% decrease in deaths that have resulted during arrests. In addition, it also states that 69 out of 3,925 protests were suppressed by state forces in 2012, a decrease of more than 50% from 2011 (39).

All of this shows continuing challenges for the Venezuelan government’s efforts at citizen security reform. However during this period, the government also reorganized its public safety model and initiated the Great Mission to All Life in Venezuela. Among other features, Provea lauds this program for promoting a holistic revamping of citizen security and policing that includes training in the respect for human rights. The new mission also includes the establishment of a national registry of victims to assist with reparations for those that have been the victims of Venezuelan police and military forces.

In 2012, there was a 2.2% increase in the prison population, which included 45,224 individuals. This includes a 4% increase in individuals in pretrial detention, which now account for 64% of the prison population. The report argues that there is an overpopulation rate of 62.93%, which includes an excess of 28,463 prisoners (41). It also points out that 591 individuals were killed in prisons in 2012.

With respect to political rights, Provea lauds the fact that over 80% of Venezuela’s voting population participated in the 2012 election, which included the participation of 40 political parties (41). However, the organization criticizes an enabling law that existed until June 2012, which allowed President Hugo Chávez to quickly push through certain legislative pieces without necessarily consulting any civil society organizations.

The organization also argues that in 2012 the government continued to use the Supreme Tribunal of Venezuela (TSJ) to intimidate opposition leaders, journalists, students, workers, and trade unions. Most notably, it highlights how the government fined Globovisión, a television channel that features several opposition journalists, for its allegedly biased coverage of the 2011 El Rodeo prison riots. It also condemns the passage of the Organic Law against Organized Delinquency and the Financing of Terrorism, which can be used against protesters and organizations that receive funds from abroad.

Provea Releases 2012 Report on Human Rights in Venezuela: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

Wed, 15 May 2013 11:32:11 -0400

Timothy Gill

Last week Provea released its annual report on human rights situation in Venezuela for the previous year (January – December 2012). In it, Provea addresses economic, social, and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights, as they are outlined in the 1999 Constitution. In this post, I outline the report’s key findings concerning economic, social, and cultural rights, and, in a later post, I will review the report’s key findings concerning civil and political rights.

The report examines conditions regarding the right to nutrition, the right to a clean environment, the right to education, labor rights, the rights of indigenous peoples, the right to social security, the right to land, the right to health, and the right to housing.

The report says that Venezuela’s average dietary food supply increased by 17.27% from 110% in 1990-1992 to 129% in 2010-2012, placing Venezuela slightly above both the Latin American average (126%) and the global average (121%) (Contexto y Balance de Situacion, p.29). Despite high inflation, the national consumer price index dropped from 27.6% in 2011 to 20.1% in 2012. While these statistics show improvement, the report also shows that domestic land used to cultivate crops has dropped by nearly 8% and as a result Venezuelan imports increased by 16% (29).

Provea describes how the Venezuelan government has begun to legally address environmental issues, establishing a new penal code involving the environment, which includes laws that prohibit degrading the environment and its biological diversity (29).

The report reveals that school enrollment rates dropped by 3% in 2012 (30). Secondary education rates in public institutions rose by 1.5%, but dropped in private secondary educations institutions by 1.8%, allowing for an overall 0.6% increase in secondary education rates. There has been an increase of 1.3 years for individuals’ average education, which contributes to 16.6% increase for the past decade (30).

The economically active part of the population rose from 64.5% in 2011 to 64.9% in 2012, an increase that includes 207,784 individuals (31). The unemployment rate also decreased from 6.5% in 2011 to 5.9% in 2012, a decrease that involves 78, 653 individuals, and employment in the formal sector of the economy increased by 2.8%, pushing employment in the formal sector up to 58% (31). In 2012, the government also increased the minimum wage by 32.25%.

The report criticizes the government for not streamlining its process of providing land titles to indigenous groups that demarcate their land holdings. The report argues that because of this, there have been several conflicts that have ensued over indigenous landholdings, resulting in six assassinations of indigenous persons in 2012 (32). Illegal mining operations have also continued to harm indigenous communities, leaving substances like mercury in some waterways and potentially exposing indigenous persons to diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis. On the positive side, the report highlights how the government has begun promoting intercultural, indigenous training within its medical training facilities for individuals who wish to serve in states with a high indigenous presence (32).

In 2012, the report notes that complaints increasingly surfaced concerning medical malpractice. In addition, infant mortality within public hospitals increased and galvanized the government’s attention, leading it to suspend 50% of its Barrio Adentro health centers. On the positive end, the government developed a National Public System of Care and Treatment of Addictions and continued establishing Centers of Integral Care (CDIs), establishing 554 of the 600 it proposed in 2004 (33).

Citizen’s access to social security increased in 2012, and the government recorded 147, 274 new beneficiaries (33). The government also initiated the Mission of Greater Love in Venezuela, which aims to assist older persons that are living in poverty.

Maduro Government Puts Military in the Streets to Fight Crime

Mon, 13 May 2013 13:08:49 -0400

David Smilde and Hugo Pérez Hernáiz

A new citizen security initiative that will include the deployment of the armed forces (FANB) alongside the National Police (PNB) is being put in place today in several areas of Caracas

The announcement was made by President Maduro and the new Justice and Interior Minister Miguel Rodríguez Torres on May 6, during a session of gobierno de la calle (“On the Street” government) with pro-government community council (CC) representatives. The CC representatives spoke of citizen security as their most important issue.

“This is a special plan to protect the people of Venezuela; our militia, army, and National Guard will be on the streets,” said Maduro. Rodríguez Torres declared that all components of the FANB would participate in the plan, but gave no further details, such as number of officers that will participate or the actual role of the FANB.

The plan has been criticized by human rights activists who see it as a return to Venezuela’s tradition of militarized policing. Liliana Ortega, director of COFAVIC argued that the plan represents an unwelcome departure from the “essentially preventive, profoundly humanist, and close to the communities” perspective provided by recent efforts at citizen security reform.

Marino Alvarado, Director of PROVEA praised the governments’ recent attempt to bring all of their citizen security reform initiatives into Misión A Toda Vida Venezuela (MATVV) but expressed concern over the new proposal. “We are worried by the announcement that the army will be put in the streets because that runs contrary to the philosophy of the MATVV, and [to international rulings] that state that the FANB should only act under exceptional circumstances and not be used to for public order.”

Luis Carlos Díaz of the Jesuit Centro Gumilla tweeted that he is part of the 30% of Venezuela “That doesn’t agree with having the armed forces participating in citizen security…I understand that people are desperate for an everyday triumph against crime, but giving the streets over to the soldiers isn’t good.”

From the first government of Rafael Caldera until 2008, Venezuela’s police forces were officially under the authority of the National Guard, and received military training. The 2006 National Police Reform Council sharply criticized this model as ineffective and the source of human rights abuses. The CONAREPOL’s recommendations were codified in the 2008 Organic Law of the Police Service which created civilian policing in Venezuela.

As we have argued before on this blog (here and here) the possibility of returning to militarized policing is omnipresent as politicians and citizens desperate to do something about Venezuela’s extraordinary levels of crime and violence return to the default logic of “mano dura.” Marino Gonzalez, columnist for Tal Cual summed up the reaction of many to the plan saying “Very original, Maduro.”

The plan proposed by Maduro and Rodríguez Torres is not yet a national plan but only a localized operation restricted to some areas of Caracas (the parish of Petare and the municipality of Baruta, both parts of metropolitan Caracas that are in Miranda State, and the parishes of El Valle, Antímano, and El Recreo of the Libertador municipality of Caracas).

Announcement of the plan came embedded in the inevitable political positioning. The May 6 gobierno de calle session was held with CC members from Chacao, Baruta, El Hatillo and Sucre municipalities—all located in Miranda. Henrique Capriles is the Governor of Miranda State and government officials have repeatedly claimed that the State has been “abandoned” by Capriles. The CC representatives expressed their concerns emphasizing that they were “orphans of mayors and the governor.” One of the representatives reminded Maduro that Capriles had been Mayor of the Baruta municipality before being elected Governor of Miranda, and that “he had not done any work for the popular areas.”

Maduro answered by suggesting that the new plan was being started in Miranda precisely because it was one of the states with highest crime rates in the country. He added that the situation had been aggravated by Miranda’s police force (which answers to the Governor). “Those in charge of the Miranda Police are malandros (delinquents). They are the ones that are conducting kidnappings and sicariato (hired killings) in Miranda.” He even suggested that in the case of an emergency “I would not open my door” to a Miranda police officer.

The opposition Mayor of Baruta municipality, Gerardo Blyde responded on Twitter to the inclusion of Baruta in the plan. “Annual homicides: Libertador 2800 (97 per 100,000 habitants) Baruta 84 (19 per 100,000), which of the two is more unsafe Maduro?”

Recent Poll Numbers Favor Venezuelan Opposition

Wed, 08 May 2013 15:27:32 -0400

David Smilde

Over the past two weeks polling results have been released with tough numbers for the government. Overall they show majority support for a full audit of the April 14 vote and the opposition turning the tables on Chavismo in favorability ratings.

A Datanalisis flashpoll from April 18-19, less than a week after the election, showed that 58% of respondents favored an audit of the ballot boxes, 51% thought the results emitted by the CNE were transparent and accurate. 49% of respondents expressed doubts.

The same methodology ten days later (April 27-30) found that 58% of respondents disapproved of the CNE’s refusal to include the voter registry books in the audit, including 40% of Nicolas Maduro’s supporters. 56% agreed with Capriles’ contesting the results in the Supreme Court.

Numbers released today from IVAD (April 28-May 5) show that 61.2% of respondents think there should have been a complete audit and only 44% have a positive view of the CNE’s work (see summaries here and here).

The numbers from April 18-19 show the candidates still about even with Maduro’s favorability at 41.6% and negatives at 37.7% (net +3.9), while Capriles’s favorability was at 42.1% and negatives were at 33.1% (net +9.0%). Given that this poll has a high margin of error +/-3.8% these numbers are a statistical tie.

In IVAD’s more recent numbers 51.3% have a favorable view of Maduro’s job performance while 46.7% have a negative view. However, the question of who people would vote for if there was a new election produced 40.8% supporting Maduro and 45.8% supporting Capriles. Furthermore, in IVAD’s analysis of political groupings, 40.7% support the government while 44% support the opposition. 52.8% of respondents manifested that they wanted the country to take a different direction while 44.7% said they wanted the country to maintain the path taken by Hugo Chávez.

It is important to note that these results are not likely to be subject to anti-government bias. In the 2012 presidential elections both firms had a small pro-government bias when comparing their last polls with the actual election results. They also both had Maduro as the strong favorite for the April 14 elections.

The Venezuelan Government’s Response to Recent International Criticism

Tue, 07 May 2013 19:29:34 -0400

Timothy Gill and David Smilde

On Saturday Venezuela vigorously responded to criticism offered by President Barack Obama earlier that day, calling on “compatriots” to “take up the slingshot of David to confront Goliath’s new aggression.” In an interview with Univision the night before Obama had said that the US was worried about the violence and the crackdown on the opposition. He said the US approach:

Is based on the notion of our basic principles of human rights and democracy and freedom of press and freedom of assembly. Are those being observed? There are reports that they have not been fully observed post-election. And you know, I think our only interest at this point is making sure that the people of Venezuela are able to determine their own destiny free from the kinds of practices that the entire hemisphere generally has moved away from.

In response, on May 4, Elias Jaua, the Venezuelan government’s Foreign Minister, read a government communiqué over national radio and television rejecting President Obama’s statements. In it, Jaua touted the sophistication of the Venezuelan electoral system and described Venezuela’s human rights record.

We find ourselves obliged to tell you what the rest of the hemisphere already knows, that in Venezuela there has been a total and absolute respect for the human rights of all, from the very moment that Commander Hugo Chávez assumed control of the Venezuelan state and pushed forward a Magna Carta that has the most advanced catalogue of rights in the region…President Obama, the people of Venezuela now fully enjoy rights and liberties that the US is still far from achieving.

Jaua went on to criticize Obama for his “imperialist double morality” for his silence regarding opposition attacks on government supporters. He said that what really is producing international concern is the United States’ inability to shutdown US detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, “where, for more than a decade, torture and other cruel treatment, degrading of human beings are practiced. This is one of the most shameful chapters of human history.”

Jaua concluded by saying that “Your false, harsh and interfering statements do not help to improve the bilateral relations between U.S. and Venezuela; on the contrary, they further deteriorate them. This only shows to the world the politics of aggression that you and your government pursue against our nation.”

This exchange came only a couple of days after an exchange with international critics of the violence in the National Assembly on April 30. On May 1, Secretary General of the Organization of American States Jose Miguel Insulza expressed concern about saying the violence “reflects, in a dramatic way, the absence of a political dialogue that could reassure the public and the branches of government, in order to resolve the outstanding issues in this country in a climate of peace between all Venezuelans.” Insulza also called on President Maduro to help “to reestablish the inalienable right of members of parliament to speak freely in the exercise of their functions.” Diosdado Cabello, the President of the National Assembly, has barred from speaking opposition assembly members that have not recognized Maduro as president.

On May 2, Jaua, stated that Insulza’s comments were made “in close coordination with spokespeople of the State Department and White House … [and were] intended to create a perception of political crisis in Venezuela which requires their mediation.” Jaua called theses statements “absolutely cynical and immoral, particularly when they come from those who have minimized and make invisible the acute facts of fascist violence, which occurred on April 15 this year and subsequent days, as a result of the lack of acknowledgment of electoral results on behalf of the loser candidate and his call to anger and violence after the April 14 elections.”

These exchanges would seem to make less likely an improvement of Venezuela’s relations with the US government and the OAS during the Maduro Administration.

On April 11, in response to an invitation from Tibisay Lucena, the President of the National Electoral Council of Venezuela, the OAS designated former New Mexican governor Bill Richardson as a Special Envoy that would travel with Alfonso Quiñonez, the Secretary for External Relations of the OAS, to “to be present in Caracas to mark the presidential election.” During their trip, Richardson and Quiñonez met with then-acting president Maduro, then-Vice President Elias Jaua, and opposition candidate Henrique Capriles, among other individuals. Richardson reported that the day before the election Maduro pulled him aside to say that “We want to improve the relationship with the U.S., regularize the relationship,” which Jaua also reiterated to him.

However, the close electoral result soured these good intentions. On April 15, Patrick Ventrell, the US State Department’s Acting Deputy Spokesperson, told reporters that “The results reveal the Venezuelan electorate that is roughly evenly divided. In order to meet all Venezuelans’ democratic expectations, it makes sense that such a recount should be completed before any additional steps, including official certification of the results, occurs.” The following day Ventrell told reporters that “the CNE’s decision to declare Mr. Maduro the victor before completing a full recount is difficult to understand.” Indeed the US did not recognize Maduro as elected president, restricting its statements to support for an audit.

In response to both the US position and the domestic opposition, Maduro said “Don’t recognize anything. We don’t care about your recognition. We have decided to be free and we are going to continue being free and independent with you or with out you. We don’t care about your opinion.”

New Globovisión Leadership Suggests Change and Continuity in Venezuelan Media

Sat, 04 May 2013 15:52:00 -0400

David Smilde and Hugo Pérez Hernáiz

On Thursday May 2, Carlos Zuloaga, vice-president of opposition Globovisión announced that the new ownership had reached terms with journalists Vladimir Villegas and Leopoldo Castillo to co-direct the station. (There will be a third co-director who has yet to be named.) Both Villegas and Castillo confirmed via twitter that they had accepted the offer.

The new team of directors points to an editorial line that would be more balanced but not break with Globovisión’s critical past. This is a big relief for those who thought the sale of Globovisión would mean a further reduction of opposition presence in broadcast media.

Vladimir Villegas is a respected journalist who currently anchors one of the most popular radio shows in Venezuela: Cuentamelo Todo [Tell me Everything] in the prime 5pm-7pm slot on Unión Radio. He has a long career in politics and journalism, forming part of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) and then latter the Causa R, the leftist party that first made participatory democracy an issue in Venezuelan politics in the 1980s and 90s.

Villegas supported Chávez in 1998 and in 1999 served in the Constitutional Assembly. In November 2003 he was named President of Venezolana de Television (VTV), the main state channel. After a year however, he resigned saying he felt uncomfortable with the editorial line of the station: “We should be more balanced, which means we should not be doing this unilateral type of journalism.”

He later served in several diplomatic positions in the Chávez government but gradually became more critical of the government, while never openly siding with the opposition. In January of this year he was interviewed by his brother, journalist, Mario Villegas. He argued that he had “Stepped off the Chávez’s bus because it took a detour; but the Carpiles bus has failed to get going.” He also declared in that interview that Venezuela’s socialism needed a glasnost, and that the real dilemma was not between left and right, but democracy and authoritarianism.

Just days before Globovisión’s announcement Villegas wrote an editorial called “I’m Talking to You Nicolas” (“Es Contigo Nicolas”). He said he wanted to talk to Maduro “as partner in struggles and dreams in a past that seems ever more distant.” He asked Maduro to remember his own fights against authoritarianism before pursuing opponents, and his own struggles for labor justice in the face of the current workplace harassment of those who voted for Capriles. He ended saying

Don’t overestimate your political support and don’t underestimate the force of those seven million Venezuelans that are demanding a change, and which today feel indignant when they are addressed with epithets and threats. The country is at a crossroads: the precipice of confrontation or the highway of constructive dialogue. You will decide where you want to take this bus full of passengers.

Upon accepting the post as co-director of Globovisión Vladimir Villegas declared that there will be changes in the station: “Evidently there are always changes when there is a new direction, a new team, but those changes will be for the better, and they must be done within continuity. I’m not here to do complacent or domesticated journalism.”

Notably, he is brother of the current Minister of Information and Communication Ernesto Villegas, with whom he claims to maintain excellent relations despite political differences (Ernesto Villegas, for example, recently referred to human rights group Provea as the “rearguard of fascism” for questioning claims regarding opposition violence.) Upon accepting his new post Leopoldo Castillo declared that teaming up with Villegas was important because Globovisión needed access to official sources.

Castillo has had a very different career path from Villegas. He was close to the Christian Democratic COPEI party and served as Ambassador to El Salvador in the 1980s. Since 2002 he has been host of Globovisión’s most popular program Aló Ciudadano. The name of the program was inspired as a response to the Chávez weekly Aló Presidente, and it is highly critical of the government. It airs daily from 5:00 to 8:00 pm. The format of the show figures Castillo and other journalists commenting the day´s news and interviewing guests.

The sale of Globovisión was announced in early March. Guillermo Zuloaga said he found himself obliged to carry out the sale because under his ownership the station was no longer viable. Indeed the announcement followed news that Globovisión had been left out of digital television. In a letter to the workers of Globovisión Zuloaga announced he had received an offer for the channel and had “an obligated intention to sell.” He explained:

We are economically unviable because our income no longer covers our expenses. We cannot even increase salaries enough to compensate for inflation, much less compensate for devaluation. We are politically unviable, because we are in a country that is totally polarized and on the opposing side we have a government that wants to see us fail. We are legally unviable because we have a concession that ends and there is little disposition [on the part of the government] to renew it.

The main investor Juan Domingo Cordero is a banker who was the president of the Caracas Stock Exchange from 1989-1993 and now owns a major insurance company. Critics suggest that he rarely invests with his own money and is likely the public face of government money. That had led many to expect that the era of Globovisión as the main, and more recently as the only, opposition television station would soon be over.

However, in Venezuela the new leadership team got rave reviews even among opposition journalists. Teodoro Petkoff, editor of Tal Cual, said “I know Vladimir well. He is a journalist that understands the media and has a democratic line. Leopoldo also knows the media well and above all, the station [Globovisión] which means he can help Vladimir. With them there I don’t anticipate a retreat. I think the station will maintain its editorial line.”

Fiercely anti-government journalist Marta Colomina called the announcement “Good news, if they really want to be a centrist channel-something that would be novel since the government channels exude fascism, and private stations have been subjected to the primitivism of Nicholas Maduro.”

Indeed the presence of Castillo would seem to guarantee continuation of an opposition line while the presence of Villegas would seem to ensure that this opposition will be serious and fair. Globovisión has undoubtedly been unfairly treated by the government in recent years-for example with the absurd accusation and fines for “inciting violence” during the prison riots of 2011. However it has done no small amount of damage to its own journalistic reputation over the years. During the 2002-03 conflict, for example, its coverage became a form of reality TV, with camera work and dramatic background music that rendered a sense of chaos and crisis.

Indeed, before the announcement, some analysts had speculated that this could actually benefit the station and political debate in Venezuela. Marie Metz suggested “by adapting a neutral stance giving equal coverage to both sides, the channel may become more respected and increase viewership.” Asked about this possibility Tinedo Guía, President of Venezuela’s National Journalists Association (Colegio Nacional de Periodistas) quoted the Bible “Peter asked Jesus ‘how will we know those who are with us?’ and Jesus responded ‘by their works you will know them.’ I think the screen will be the best way to tell the line the new owners will take. “

Why did Maduro Adopt Crime as a Campaign Issue?

Fri, 03 May 2013 14:01:36 -0400

Rebecca Hanson

As I noted in previous post, during the recent campaign Maduro took up citizen security as a banner in a way that his predecessor never did. Given that crime rates in the country rose significantly under Chávez this strategy was somewhat risky, drawing attention to a problem that the government has, thus far, failed to solve. Why bring up such a potentially damaging issue in a race that was already full of uncertainties for the Chavista coalition?

Some commentators have explained his focus this way: Maduro was forced to take on the issue of crime in a way that Chávez never did because he lacks the charisma of his mentor. For example, Roberto Briceño-Leon, the head of the Venezuelan Violence Observatory, said that “Chávez was able to keep such a dramatic issue from affecting him politically because of his personal force and connection” to the poor, those most affected by crime.”

The implication here is that Chávez was able to hide behind his charisma, allowing him to “get away” with neglecting a severe problem in Venezuela. His supporters, blinded by his personality, did not recognize the rise in crime that took place under his administration.

However, the lower-class residents that I work with are well aware of crime in their neighborhoods and understand how it impacts their lives. While the “power” of the former president’s charisma is undeniable, Maduro’s lack of it does not tell us why he adopted an issue that worsened year-by-year under Chávez. In this post. I would like to delve into some of the complexities that characterize the relationship between crime and the Chávez government and suggest a few reasons for why Maduro might have taken up such a delicate issue.

First, it is important to recognize that, apart from the advantages his charisma provided, Chávez did not “pay” politically for crime for a number of reasons. Consider the following conversation I was part of. It took place in a PDVSA Jeep (Jeeps are a main form of public transportation in the barrios and PDVSA, the state oil company, provides a subsidized version of them throughout the city) as I was riding up to my house in Los Magallanes de Catia a few weeks ago with a neighbor (Los Magallanes is a lower-class barrio with one of the higher crime and homicide rates in the sector of Catia). When we climbed inside I immediately noticed a sign announcing that the Jeep’s service would begin ending at 10:30 at night due to “la inseguridad” (crime) in the area. My neighbor—an ardent Chavista—read the sign out loud and in a frustrated voice stated that crime had become “a shame” in the area, which led to a slew of commentary.

One man said that poverty had always existed but had not always generated the crime that it does now. Recollecting on his childhood growing up in Los Magallanes, he reminisced that there had been space to play soccer and sports but now, he asked, “Where do the children have to play? Where is there space for recreation? We send them out into the street.” He suggested that what had changed was not the conditions of poverty but the loss of values that came along with the loss of these spaces.

Another man offered up that people always neglected to recognize crimes of “cuello y corbata” (or white collar crime), which he said were the crimes that really hurt people in the barrios, as they stole money from the government. My neighbor agreed and said that it was this kind of crime that took money away from their access to education and healthcare.

Towards the end of the conversation there was a verbal consensus that the most important changes that needed to take place were “en el hogar y dentro de la familia” (in the home and the family), and that people try to blame the government for crime but that criminals are not formed by the state but in the home.

Among the list of reasons that people in the Jeep gave for rising crime, the government was mentioned only once; and, when it was brought into the conversation, it was not even cited as one of the main parties responsible. In general, Catians are much more likely to attribute crime to a lack of education, access to basic resources like space, or to a failing family structure than a lack of police or government action. If they reminisce about a time when there was less violence in their neighborhood, they usually recall a period when there was more space for recreation, when the family was more stable, and when children had “values”—a period that existed long before Chávez was on the scene.

A second reason that taking on issues of citizen security might have seemed plausible to the Maduro campaign is that people do not necessarily see the government as doing nothing about citizen security. Precisely because many Venezuelans identify education, the home, and limited access to basic resources as the roots of crime, the missions that the government has been supporting for years (focusing on education and health services, and housing more recently) make sense to people as a potent way to reduce crime. What this means is that even though the government left prisons, the police, and judicial reform untouched for years many lower-class residents would probably say that the state has been attacking the roots of “la inseguridad”(crime) for over a decade. By supporting education, community organizations, and the construction of homes, many believe that the government is treating the causes rather than just the symptoms of crime.

Indeed, one can see that Maduro’s citizen security platform is closely linked to these previous missions—especially those missions that have supported culture, sports, and music in the barrios. Perhaps one of the key strengths of programs such as the recently announced Movimiento de Paz is that they draw on activities that lower-class residents have been engaging in for years—in some case decades—either through the community councils and communes or through community organizations that existed long before the Chávez government.

Given these perceptions of the “roots of crime,” it is likely that Maduro could have organized a successful campaign without aggressively adopting an issue that speaks to a weak point of his predecessor’s governance (according to government statistics in 1986 there were 8 homicides per 100,000 residents; 2012 closed out with 54/100,000). In other words, it is not necessarily the case that Maduro had to address crime in such an explicit fashion. Why, then, might he have chosen to do so?

One possible reason has to do with the misperception that Chávez utterly neglected citizen security throughout his terms as president. It is undoubtedly true that Chávez spent a his first term in office without touching citizen security, and when strategies were implemented they were sporadic and short-term. Nevertheless, since about 2007 the government has increasingly allocated resources and support for research (like the CONAREPOL report), legislation (such as the 2008 Organic Law of the Police Service and of the National Police Body), institution building (like the National Security University [UNES] and the General Police Council [CGP]), the Presidential Commission on Gun Control and more recently missions dedicated to citizen security, and community initiatives (like the “Mothers for Peace”) with an eye towards reducing crime and violence in a comprehensive manner. Many of these were announced on national television. While these initiatives are far from perfect, they complicate perceptions that Chávez breezed past citizen security by relying on personality alone.

And, while the government might not be perceived as one of the key solutions to crime, over the years the president and his administration became much more tightly linked to security initiatives than they had been previously. As one woman in La Vega (another popular sector in Caracas) recently explained to me, given the violent history of the Metropolitan Police in her sector she was extremely skeptical when the National Bolivarian Police began working in the neighborhood. However, she told herself to wait and give this police a chance since they had Chávez’s support and had been born out of his government.

Thus, another possible explanation for why Maduro might have taken on the banner of security in his campaign is because the Chávez government has been addressing citizen security for a number of years now, and is thus linked to the institutions that came out of this push. And, having actively attempted to address crime, the government is now open to criticisms (like those of Capriles) that they are incapable of solving it. Furthermore, if people identify UNES, the PNB, and the CGP with Chávez’s administration that means that evaluating their work and progress will result in an evaluation of his—and now Maduro’s—government as well.

Finally, in discussing Chávez’s charisma it is important to understand that this charisma cannot be separated from people’s perception that he was a leader that could “get things done,” despite institutional bureaucracy, corruption, and inefficiency. In other words, the “connection to the people” that Briceño-Leon cites stemmed from a belief that Chávez was a president that followed up his words with actions.

If Chavistas did not expect this same charisma from Maduro during the campaign, what they do expect from him now is that he continues with Chávez’s plans. As one mechanic in my neighborhood put it, “Maduro can follow Chávez’s path or we will throw him out!” In other words, Chávez’s supporters are probably more interested in seeing that Maduro continues with the missions and programs that Chávez started, proving that he too can push through bureaucratic obstacles and corruption to accomplish what he has promised.

Taking a hands-on personal approach to crime and the government’s initiatives to fight it was one way of assuring voters that he can keep the ball rolling on Chávez’s legacy. In one of his recent speeches Maduro made explicit reference to these previous missions and the government’s ability to “finish crime off.” According to Maduro, the government was going to turn the same political will it had used to “end illiteracy and build over 350,000 dignified homes,” in the country to end crime and violence.