Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights

Hugo Pérez Hernáiz

The National Electoral Council has officially set municipal elections for December 8th, 2013. Between mayors and representatives to the municipal councils of 335 municipalities, up to 2,792 posts will be elected.

Both sides are already refining their mobilization strategies.

The Government

Municipal elections have a strong regional character that make them different from presidential elections. However, the December 8 elections will inevitably be seen as a sort of referendum on the Maduro government.

On June 4th, speaking to supporters in Carabobo, Maduro argued that “if recently [referring to the April 14th elections] we won in 71% of all municipalities, on December 8 we will win no less that 80% of the municipalities of the country. You can count on that.”

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[Moderators note: Thanks to Mike McCarthy for pointing out that Maduro’s margin of victory was 220,000 votes, not 120,000. The post has been corrected. -DS]

David Smilde

The Washington Post’s editorial criticizing the US for “extending a lifeline to Maduro” has a serious misinterpretation at its center. 

The editorial is right when it says Maduro is confronting serious economic problems and serious political divisions in his coalition, and that the Venezuelan opposition is not recognizing Maduro’s April 14 election victory. However it is factually wrong when it says :

Other Latin American governments, while avoiding a confrontation with Caracas, have made it clear they regard the new leader’s legitimacy as questionable; the regional group Unasur called for an audit of the election results. One government, however, has chosen to toss Mr. Maduro a lifeline: the United States.”

The truth is exactly the opposite. The only government in the hemisphere that has not recognized Maduro’s election is the United States. All other countries including the US’s close ally and Venezuela’s neighbor Colombia recognized the election result quickly. Furthermore, Unasur did not call for an audit of the results, it endorsed an audit of the result after the National Electoral Council announced it. It also called on Venezuela’s political actors to recognize the electoral result.

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David Smilde

What are the politics of the recent tensions between Venezuela and Colombia?

The most recent tensions started when Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos agreed to meet with former presidential candidate and current Miranda Governor Henrique Capriles. For the Venezuelan government that was an affront because Capriles does not recognize Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela. Closely on the heels of that meeting Santos announced Colombia’s intention to strengthen ties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This latter is significant since NATO is the world’s most powerful military alliance.

Venezuela’s entire foreign policy has been predicated on the idea of Latin American unity and recent years have seen significant progress with the creation of the Union of Southern Nations (UNASUR) and the Council of Latin American Heads of State (CELAC). Colombia’s presence and collaboration has been an essential element of this and their moving closer to NATO could throw a wrench in regional unity.

Part of what has happened is that Juan Manuel Santos is up for reelection in May 2014 and this seems like a move to strengthen his credentials as being tough on Venezuela—both Hugo Chávez and now Nicolas Maduro are very unpopular in Colombia—and close to the United States. Santos was elected as the successor to Uribe. But one of his major policy shifts as president was to reconcile and strengthen ties with Venezuela. This has helped the Colombian economy and facilitated a peace process with guerrilla groups but included sacrifices such as pulling out of a deal with the United States to have US military presence at Colombian bases.

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Human rights group PROVEA (Venezuela Program for Education and Action in Human Rights) has released the second edition of its new International Bulletin on Human Rights. The Bulletin is released in Spanish, Portuguese, French and English and the most important human rights issues of the month. This edition looks at the right to housing and the government’s housing mission, the conflict over indigenous land claims in Western Venezuela, and the need for dialogue in the post-electoral context.

Melina Sánchez Montañés and David Smilde

Venezuela’s May economic numbers were dismal with inflation reaching a 35.2% annualized rate, growth at a 0.7% snail’s pace, and widespread scarcities of basic consumer products. How is this “stagflation” possible in an economy benefiting from oil prices over $100 per barrel?

The short answer is that Venezuela’s petrodollars can no longer meet demand. Venezuela produced an average of 3.03 million barrels of crude oil per day in 2012, providing the government with a total of USD 85.9 billion[1]. However, this was not enough to feed the dramatic growth in public spending during an electoral year, nor to supply the dollars needed for ever growing imports. This spending[2] generated an impressive 5.6%[3] annual growth rate in 2012, though at the expense of heavy local borrowing and Chinese loans. While external debt only increased by 8%[4], internal debt soared[5], rising by 65.6%. 

But perhaps a more important cause of the current economic situation is the distortion of the currency system. Imposed in 2003, exchange control has rendered a progressive overvaluation of the Bolívar, which has led to a wave of imports targeted for consumption rather than investment, as well as capital flight.

When no major variation in the input of petrodollars is recorded[6] and demand remains in a steep upward slope, outside financing becomes key to ensure currency supply to the local market. This, of course, translates into higher foreign debt.

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David Smilde

Few of us believed the rumors last week that a breakthrough in US-Venezuela relations was in the works. The obstacles seemed too large as the US still had not recognized Nicolas Maduro as the winner of the April 14 election. And Venezuelan officials at all levels had accused the US of multiple conspiracies, including one in which filmmaker Tim Tracy was supposedly financing opposition protesters. Tracy was jailed at the end of April.

But Tuesday’s news of a scheduled meeting between Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua and US Secretary of State John Kerry, and Wednesday morning’s news that Tracy had been released and expelled from Venezuela made clear that something significant could happen.

Indeed it was the highest level meeting between the two countries since Obama and Chávez shook hands at the Summit of the Americas in 2009, and represented an important breakthrough (See AP coverage here and Spanish language coverage here and here). The meeting lasted 40 minutes and ended with a photo op and brief press conference with each leader expressing the desire for improved relations, announcing a working plan to resolve differences, and the desire to reestablish diplomatic relations including the exchange of ambassadors.

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David Smilde and Hugo Pérez Hernáiz

Last week’s meeting between Miranda governor Henrique Capriles and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos began a sequence of events that has revealed the fragility in what has been heretofore a source of strength for the Maduro government—international relations.

The private Santos-Capriles meeting at Casa de Nariño in Bogotá lasted less than an hour and was low key. There were no public declarations or joint statements after the meeting, and only one photo was released showing a formally attired Capriles shaking hands with a casually dressed Santos.

However the reaction by the Venezuelan Government was strident. Almost every high official of the government used strong language to refer to the meeting. Elias Jaua, Venezuelan Foreign Minister, declared that  “To receive a person that does not recognize the Venezuelan institutions and that openly called for violence on April 15^th is a very bad sign and reveals what we have repeated many times: there is a conspiracy against Venezuela from Bogotá.

In response to the meeting President Nicolas Maduro recalled Roy Chaderton, Venezuelan envoy to the Colombian peace negotiations in Cuba. “I have doubts whether this peace process should continue…During the electoral campaign I received envoys from President Santos and, authorized by him, I negotiated with the Colombian guerrilla in order to achieve peace in Colombia…Now he repays us with this? With betrayal?”

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Hugo Pérez Hernáiz and David Smilde

What originally appeared as a visible but subtle change of direction at television station Glovovisión has in the last two weeks become a raucous turning point with multiple journalists being fired or resigning. The turmoil leaves Globovisión’s role as an opposition outlet in doubt and appears to represent a new extension of the Venezuelan government’s control over broadcast media.

Following Guillermo Zuloaga’s announcement in March that he had agreed in principle to the sale of Globovisión it was finally acquired at the beginning of May by a business group rumored to have ties with the Government.

Announcement of the hiring of journalists Vladimir Villegas and Leopoldo Castillo as station directors generated considerable optimism about the new Globovisión and its independence. However on May 13, after a meeting with the new owners, Villegas surprisingly announced on Twitter that he would not be accepting the position after all. He commented that “we didn’t reach agreement on programming nor on what my competencies would be.” 

One of the new owners, Juan Domingo Cordero, declared on May 16th that there had been disagreements in the meeting with Villegas over the general direction the business should follow, but he assured that there would be no changes in the channel and that all the journalists would keep their jobs: “All the news anchors are staying, there won´t be any changes here.”

However events have unfolded quite differently.

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Hugo Pérez Hernáiz and David Smilde

In the six weeks since Venezuela’s snap presidential elections conspiracy theories have continued to be central to the Maduro government’s public statements. Illiberal movements are premised on the idea that transparent and accountable institutions are a sham, a smokescreen for the real action that takes place behind the scenes. As such they are constantly tuned in to signs of a conspiracy, a coordinated action that takes place covertly to achieve an end in a way that would not be considered legitimate were it made public.

In the Venezuelan case, conspiracy theories are to be understood in the context of anti-imperialist and anti-American rhetoric that, given the long history of US intervention in the region, resonates well with part of the population.

As we argued previously, whether they are true or not, denunciations of conspiracy have the same effect. They unify followers behind leadership that has information about a treacherous but silent enemy. They silence dissent by making it look out of place given the urgency of the situation. And, of course, they serve as an efficient way to deflect criticism over problems of governance.

Since our previous post we have continued to track the conspiracy theories forwarded by the Maduro government. 

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David Smilde

If Monday’s release of a recording of pro-government talk show host Mario Silva detailing corruption and conspiracies in the government simply made public what was long an open secret, the response in the following days has provided a window into the balance of power within and dilemmas confronting Chavismo.

What at the moment looked like it could be a power play from the left of the coalition, in which Maduro, Silva and their Cuban advisors might be moving to marginalize National Assembly president Diosdado Cabello, quickly turned into a scramble for cover. Immediately after the release, Silva tweeted that a Zionist conspiracy was in the works. Later he read a statement on his program saying the recording was a montage created by international foes of the revolution but that he was going to take a break from his television show to seek medical treatment in Cuba. The next day Silva posted a reflection which included more denials and a folksy story about his long, warm relationship with Cabello.

Maduro restricted his responses to ad hominem attacks on those who released the video, suggesting it was an attempt to divide the revolution. The next day almost everyone alluded to in the recording went to Orchila Island with the manifest purpose of watching military maneuvers but clearly with the goal of addressing the fallout from the recording.

In all of this the main object of accusations in the recording, Diosdado Cabello, remained eerily cool and unphased. Cabello refused discussion of the recording in the AN and calmly suggested hat he had weathered many storms over the years.

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David Smilde

The opposition’s big news, publicized for 24 hours, actually exceeded expectations. They played an audio recording (see transcript here) of television host Mario Silva speaking with Cuban G2 agent Aramis Palacio. The interview is crystal clear, vintage Silva vocabulary and style, and incredibly damning of Diosdado Cabello. In the recording Silva portrays Maduro as weak but honest and well-intentioned.

As one analyst put it, what was once an open secret, is now public knowledge. Nothing in the audio will surprise those close to the inner workings of the government. But it will have an impact among everyday chavistas as well as those independents that support the government.

Of course the question is how this audio, apparently taped by Silva himself in order to send to Raul Castro, got in the hands of the opposition.

At first glance this looks like a maneuver on the part of Maduro and Silva to bring to light Cabello’s treachery and definitively marginalize him. Supporting this interpretation is that Maduro did not order a cadena to block transmission until after the audio was completely run on the air. One could imagine Maduro using this to publicly confront Cabello. 

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Rebecca Hanson

The recent announcement of the Plan Patria Segura by the Maduro government (see reports here and here), which puts the armed forces in the street alongside the National Police force, signals a continued reliance on the military to combat crime in the country (see previous post here). 

On the one hand, many Venezuelans see the military, especially the National Guard, as more capable of dealing with “el hampa” (criminal activity) than the police. Furthermore, including the army in citizen security initiatives might signal to some that the government recognizes the gravity of the crime situation and is responding in full force. 

On the other hand, continuing to rely upon militarized initiatives to control crime seems to contradict the steps forward that police reform has made in recent years.  The National Bolivarian Police force (the Policía Nacional Bolivariana, or PNB), created by a 2008 organic law, was the result of efforts by human rights activists, scholars, and those within already existing police bodies to create a preventative, professional, and non-militarized citizen security force.

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David Smilde

I did an interview with Al Jazeera’s “Min Washington” program yesterday regarding the challenges and future of Chavismo without Chávez. I would put it up on the blog but it won’t air until next week and then will have Arabic voice overs. Here is a summary of what I said.

The first issue we talked about was Maduro’s rough first month and what it means for Chavismo after Chávez. I suggested that indeed it has not been easy. The election was closer than anybody thought it was going to be, with approximately 6% of the electorate switching from Chávez to Capriles between October 2012 and April 2013. Since then Maduro’s numbers have only worsened with majorities of the Venezuelan population disagreeing with the National Electoral Council’s (CNE) decision to not do a full audit, and some polls suggesting that Henrique Capriles would win if new elections were held. The optics of the April 30 violence in the National Assembly (AN) were terrible, and the government’s video trying to blame it on the opposition only turned tragedy into farce.

What is incredible is that Maduro’s rocky first month has come without really beginning to address the significant political and economic challenges Venezuela faces. There has been no talk of the communal state-something that is important for the left part of the coalition. And only in the past week have Venezuela’s economic issues come to the fore. 

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Timothy Gill

Last week Provea released its 2012 annual report on human rights in Venezuela. In a previous post, I outlined their findings regarding economic, social, and cultural rights, as they are presented in the 1999 Constitution. In this post, I review the report’s key findings concerning civil and political rights.

Perhaps the most important finding was continuing deterioration in citizen security. In 2012, official figures say there were 14,852 homicides, a number which continues at an upward trend. For Venezuela, this means a rate of 51 homicides per 100,000 citizens. This number rises to 23,506 homicides, or 78 per 100,000 citizens, when deaths occurring while “resisting arrest” and deaths under investigation are included (42). By comparison, in 2010, there were 13,080 homicides, 45 per 100,000 citizens. With the inclusion of those “resisting arrest” and deaths under investigation in 2010, the number of homicides rises to 21,080, a rate of 73 homicides per 100,000 citizens (407). Provea does not provide homicide figures for 2011 in this report. Until August 2012, 155 police and military persons were also killed while on duty. The report argues that the government has begun to address these issues through the Great Mission to All Life in Venezuela as well as establishing the Presidential Commission for Disarmament, which established a national gun registry to in order to reduce illegal gun ownership.

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Timothy Gill 

Last week Provea released its annual report on human rights situation in Venezuela for the previous year (January – December 2012). In it, Provea addresses economic, social, and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights, as they are outlined in the 1999 Constitution. In this post, I outline the report’s key findings concerning economic, social, and cultural rights, and, in a later post, I will review the report’s key findings concerning civil and political rights. 

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David Smilde and Hugo Pérez Hernáiz

A new citizen security initiative that will include the deployment of the armed forces (FANB) alongside the National Police (PNB) is being put in place today in several areas of Caracas

The announcement was made by President Maduro and the new Justice and Interior Minister Miguel Rodríguez Torres on May 6, during a session of gobierno de la calle (“On the Street” government) with pro-government community council (CC) representatives. The CC representatives spoke of citizen security as their most important issue. 

“This is a special plan to protect the people of Venezuela; our militia, army, and National Guard will be on the streets,” said Maduro. Rodríguez Torres declared that all components of the FANB would participate in the plan, but gave no further details, such as number of officers that will participate or the actual role of the FANB.

The plan has been criticized by human rights activists who see it as a return to Venezuela’s tradition of militarized policing. Liliana Ortega, director of COFAVIC argued that the plan represents an unwelcome departure from the “essentially preventive, profoundly humanist, and close to the communities” perspective provided by recent efforts at citizen security reform. 

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David Smilde

Over the past two weeks polling results have been released with tough numbers for the government. Overall they show majority support for a full audit of the April 14 vote and the opposition turning the tables on Chavismo in favorability ratings.

A Datanalisis flashpoll from April 18-19, less than a week after the election, showed that 58% of respondents favored an audit of the ballot boxes, 51% thought the results emitted by the CNE were transparent and accurate. 49% of respondents expressed doubts.

The same methodology ten days later (April 27-30) found that 58% of respondents disapproved of the CNE’s refusal to include the voter registry books in the audit, including 40% of Nicolas Maduro’s supporters. 56% agreed with Capriles’ contesting the results in the Supreme Court.

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Timothy Gill and David Smilde

On Saturday Venezuela vigorously responded to criticism offered by President Barack Obama earlier that day, calling on “compatriots” to “take up the slingshot of David to confront Goliath’s new aggression.” In an interview with Univision the night before Obama had said that the US was worried about the violence and the crackdown on the opposition. He said the US approach:

Is based on the notion of our basic principles of human rights and democracy and freedom of press and freedom of assembly. Are those being observed? There are reports that they have not been fully observed post-election. And you know, I think our only interest at this point is making sure that the people of Venezuela are able to determine their own destiny free from the kinds of practices that the entire hemisphere generally has moved away from.

In response, on May 4, Elias Jaua, the Venezuelan government’s Foreign Minister, read a government communiqué over national radio and television rejecting President Obama’s statements.  In it, Jaua touted the sophistication of the Venezuelan electoral system and described Venezuela’s human rights record.

We find ourselves obliged to tell you what the rest of the hemisphere already knows, that in Venezuela there has been a total and absolute respect for the human rights of all, from the very moment that Commander Hugo Chávez assumed control of the Venezuelan state and pushed forward a Magna Carta that has the most advanced catalogue of rights in the region…President Obama, the people of Venezuela now fully enjoy rights and liberties that the US is still far from achieving.

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David Smilde and Hugo Pérez Hernáiz

On Thursday May 2, Carlos Zuloaga, vice-president of opposition Globovisión announced that the new ownership had reached terms with journalists Vladimir Villegas and Leopoldo Castillo to co-direct the station. (There will be a third co-director who has yet to be named.) Both Villegas and Castillo confirmed via twitter that they had accepted the offer.

The new team of directors points to an editorial line that would be more balanced but not break with Globovisión’s critical past. This is a big relief for those who thought the sale of Globovisión would mean a further reduction of opposition presence in broadcast media.

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Rebecca Hanson

As I noted in previous post, during the recent campaign Maduro took up citizen security as a banner in a way that his predecessor never did. Given that crime rates in the country rose significantly under Chávez this strategy was somewhat risky, drawing attention to a problem that the government has, thus far, failed to solve. Why bring up such a potentially damaging issue in a race that was already full of uncertainties for the Chavista coalition?

Some commentators have explained his focus this way: Maduro was forced to take on the issue of crime in a way that Chávez never did because he lacks the charisma of his mentor. For example, Roberto Briceño-Leon, the head of the Venezuelan Violence Observatory, said that “Chávez was able to keep such a dramatic issue from affecting him politically because of his personal force and connection” to the poor, those most affected by crime.”

The implication here is that Chávez was able to hide behind his charisma, allowing him to “get away” with neglecting a severe problem in Venezuela. His supporters, blinded by his personality, did not recognize the rise in crime that took place under his administration.

However, the lower-class residents that I work with are well aware of crime in their neighborhoods and understand how it impacts their lives. While the “power” of the former president’s charisma is undeniable, Maduro’s lack of it does not tell us why he adopted an issue that worsened year-by-year under Chávez. In this post. I would like to delve into some of the complexities that characterize the relationship between crime and the Chávez government and suggest a few reasons for why Maduro might have taken up such a delicate issue.

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